Western New England Law Review
Volume 40 40 (2018)
Issue 1

Article 5

2018

COPYRIGHT LAW—UNFAIR USE:
UNIONIZING CONTENT CREATORS
THROUGH LEGISLATION TO SOLVE THE
PROBLEM OF MASS DIGITIZATION
Timothy A. Rucki

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview
Recommended Citation
Timothy A. Rucki, COPYRIGHT LAW—UNFAIR USE: UNIONIZING CONTENT CREATORS THROUGH LEGISLATION TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF MASS DIGITIZATION, 40 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 85 (2018), http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/
lawreview/vol40/iss1/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Review & Student Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England
University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Western New England Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @
Western New England University School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

COPYRIGHT LAW—UNFAIR USE: UNIONIZING
CONTENT CREATORS THROUGH LEGISLATION TO SOLVE
THE PROBLEM OF MASS DIGITIZATION
Timothy A. Rucki*
Mass digitization is the way of the future. Universities, businesses,
and private collectors alike are taking entire libraries, scanning
them onto computers, and making them into searchable documents.
This makes out-of-print works accessible to brand-new audiences,
gives researchers new tools for studying language usage over time,
and allows passages from books to be found in search engine results.
Google and the Authors Guild just finished a decade-long court
battle in the Second Circuit over whether Google’s “Google Books”
project—an undertaking which has mass digitized thirty million
books to date without getting prior permission from individual
authors—is a legally permissible endeavor. Google won. But that’s
not the end of this story. The Second Circuit determined that Google
Books was permissible under the fair use doctrine, but this decision
did not and cannot adequately serve as the final authority on mass
digitization projects. This decision disrespects the needs of authors,
which in turn disrespects the needs of the public. Congressional
legislation must be enacted to regulate mass digitization. It is the
only way we can ensure that authors, mass digitizers, and the public
alike have their interests represented.
This Note argues that Congress should pass legislation utilizing a
framework already formulated by the Copyright Office. Legislation
would create Copyright Management Organizations, which would
negotiate directly with mass digitizers on behalf of individual
copyright holders for licensing fees to use their works.
Congressional action would warm the frosty climate that stifles
digitization efforts. This Note will prove this assertion by examining
the success of similar schemes both domestically and internationally,
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for her insight while developing this piece. I would also like to thank the entire staff of the
Western New England Law Review for their magnificent contributions to this work. Finally, I
would like to thank my parents, Julie and Walter, and my siblings, Brian and Leah, for nearly
a quarter century of steadfast support.
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in both the public and private sectors.

INTRODUCTION
Over twenty-two centuries ago, Pharaoh Ptolemy I hatched a plan to
compile the world’s written works into a singular, accessible collection
in the Great Library at Alexandria.1 Motivated by a great hunger for
knowledge, Ptolemy I and his sons generously funded this project, and
would search each ship that arrived at the port of Alexandria for new
manuscripts to duplicate.2 Over 100 scribes worked to translate and
copy these texts.3 Upon completion of each scroll, the library often
retained the original, and a copy was sent to the original owner.4 With
an estimated 500,000 scrolls, the Great Library held “between 30 and 70
percent of all books in existence.”5 Tragically, with nearly all the
world’s books under one roof, unknown perpetrators burned the Great
Library to the ground.6
With the destruction of the Great Library, humanity’s last concerted
effort to centralize the world’s knowledge ended.7 This dream has
drifted into a state of impossibility over the last two millennia, as the
sheer volume of new information being generated has far outpaced our
ability to process, compartmentalize, and archive it.8
In the summer of 2015, librarians in Berkley, California, went
through the process of painstakingly selecting forty thousand books to
remove from the shelves to save space.9 Not all of these books were sent
off to the recycling center.10 Many were donated to nonprofits or given a
second home elsewhere.11 But this provided little comfort for throngs of
protesters, who balked at the restriction of society’s collective access to

1. See Brian Haughton, What Happened to the Great Library at Alexandria?, ANCIENT
HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 1, 2011), http://www.ancient.eu/article/207/ [https://perma.cc/
RS2Z-HJJ4].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Kevin Kelly, Scan This Book!, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 14, 2006, PROQUEST, Doc.
No. 215466243.
6. Haughton, supra note 1.
7. See Kelly, supra note 5.
8. See id.
9. Daniel A. Gross, Weeding the Worst Library Books, NEW YORKER (Apr. 26, 2016),
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/weeding-the-worst-library-books
[https://perma.cc/GJJ4-JRUH].
10. Id.
11. Id.
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information.12 Library officials call the process “weeding,” and assert
that it is a practical, well-researched practice, with medieval origins.13
Further, Berkeley librarian Mary Kelly reasoned that “public libraries
aren’t designed to preserve unusual texts . . . . ‘There are places where
you want to hang on to the weird stuff of our culture. That’s in
museums and archives.’”14
Maybe Kelly has a point. Perhaps the odds and ends of the world’s
cultures do not belong in the limited shelf space of the nation’s libraries,
whose financial situations are “at best, furiously treading water.”15
However, solutions to a library’s limits on shelf space should not
inherently condemn thousands of books to dusty, seldom-traveled
archives. Libraries are intended to better communities and serve the
public good, and Kelly’s outlook on what to do with surplus literature
overlooks an avenue more convenient and practical to serve these
interests—the digitization of these works to one online medium with
endless available space.16
Much like the ancient Egyptians, Google has undertaken the mission
of curating every book that has ever been published—all 129 million,
spanning over 480 different languages.17 However, instead of 100
scribes translating scrolls onto papyrus, Google is employing an armada
of lightning-fast scanners and converting print pages into computer
documents at a rate of 6000 pages per hour.18 Instead of sailing ships on
the high seas to faraway lands, Google has negotiated contracts with
major universities and public libraries for usage of their books.19

12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Michael Kelley, The New Normal: Annual Library Budgets Survey 2012, LIBR. J.
(Jan. 16, 2012), http://lj.libraryjournal.com/2012/01/funding/the-new-normal-annual-librarybudgets-survey-2012/ [https://perma.cc/7KWK-KA5N].
16. Joab Jackson, Google: 129 Million Different Books Have Been Published,
PCWORLD (Aug. 6, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/202803/
google_129_million_different_books_have_been_published.html
[https://perma.cc/S9F8CB6L].
17. See id. The 129 million figure is an estimate reached through analyzing cataloging
methods such as International Standard Book Numbers (ISBN). Id. The 480 language figure
accounts for languages encountered thus far, and even includes works written in languages
derived from fiction, such as Klingon. Id.
18. See Stephen Heyman, Google Books: A Complex and Controversial Experiment,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2015, PROQUEST, Doc. No. 1727707444.
19. See generally UC Libraries Mass Digitization Projects, CAL. DIG. LIBRARY (Mar.
20, 2015), http://www.cdlib.org/services/collections/massdig/faq.html [https://perma.cc/
7QQN-F8KY].
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Google has begun a process called mass digitization.20 Mass
digitization is defined as “the conversion of [written] materials on an
industrial scale . . . of whole libraries without making a selection of
individual materials.”21 Despite the vocal and almost universal support
for the concept of mass digitization, Google’s project has faced
uncertainty and controversy since its incarnation.22
The uncertainty in the project is two-fold. First, mass digitization
traditionally has relied upon the questionable practice of appropriating
books into projects without first obtaining a license from the respective
copyright holders.23 Mass digitizers rationalize this practice under the
fair use doctrine, but this doctrine alone is inadequate to monitor or
protect mass digitization projects.24
Second, no governmental body with the authority to make binding
rules regarding mass digitization is currently willing to do so.25 The
Copyright Office does not have adequate authority and courts defer to
Congress, but Congress has not even begun to explore its options.26 The
closest thing to a rule that exists is a single decision by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals in Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., which held, in
a highly specific fact pattern, that Google’s mass digitization project is
permissible under the fair use doctrine.27 This decision will be discussed

20. Karen Coyle, Mass Digitization of Books, 32 J. ACAD. LIBRARIANSHIP 641, 641
(2006).
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States of America Regarding Proposed
Amended Settlement Agreement at 1, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2011) (No. 05 Civ. 8136) [hereinafter U.S. Statement of Interest]; see also
Where We Stand, Authors Guild v. Google, AUTHORS GUILD https://www.authorsguild.org/
where-we-stand/authors-guild-v-google/ [https://perma.cc/A26T-KJW3].
23. Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
24. See id. at 289–90; U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, ORPHAN WORKS AND MASS
DIGITIZATION: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 40–41 (2015),
https://www.copyright.gov/orphan/reports/orphan-works2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3WH5967].
25. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212–13 (2003); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 28, Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 05 Civ.
8136) (on file with the Authors Guild) [hereinafter Transcript of Oral Argument]. During oral
arguments, presiding Judge Chin remarked, “[i]s anything done in Congress these days? How
long would it take reasonably for this to be resolved in Congress? Even the issue of orphan
books has been percolating in Congress for years and years.” Transcript of Oral Argument at
28.
26. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 128; see also Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
25, at 28.
27. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 229 (2d Cir. 2015).

2018]

UNIONIZING CONTENT CREATORS THROUGH LEGISLATION

89

and analyzed at length throughout this Note.
Since there is currently insufficient statutory, common law, or
regulatory guidance on the topic, it is imperative that Congress pass
legislation that solves the mass digitization problem. Specifically, this
Note will argue that Congress should implement an extended collective
licensing model overseen by the Copyright Office, which would permit
Copyright Management Organizations to negotiate on behalf of all
creators of a certain type of written work.
Part I of this Note will introduce the background of copyright law,
explain its history from the sixth century up through the modern day, and
introduce mass digitization—both the technology and digitizers’
intentions. Then, it will discuss the problems that mass digitization is
facing conceptually, through the lenses of individual stakeholders,
Congress, the Judiciary, mass digitizers, content creators, and content
consumers. Finally, Part I will conclude by outlining the fair use
doctrine and applying it to mass digitization.
Part II of this Note argues for a legislative solution to the mass
digitization problem and begins by describing the necessity for
legislation. Additionally, Part II will demonstrate how the fair use
doctrine is inefficient, and provide three possible legislative solutions:
direct licensing, voluntary collective licensing, and extended collective
licensing. Ultimately, this Note argues that an extended collective
licensing model is the best legislative solution.
Part III will then discuss the compatibility of collective licensing
models with creative works. Therein, parallels are drawn between
extended collective licensing legislation and the activities of the
American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers. Further,
similarities with international programs, both private and public, that
serve similar purposes to the proposed legislation will be examined.
Lastly, Part III will address counterarguments and reaffirm the necessity
for this proposed legislation.
I.

BACKGROUND OF COPYRIGHT LAW

Part I of this Note aims to highlight ancient and present-day
conflicts in copyright systems, both in the United States and abroad.
These disagreements set the stage for illuminating what the place of
mass digitization is within the context of copyright law, and why mass
digitization is a contentious issue.

90

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:85

A. History and Makeup of the Copyright System
In modern America, the copyright system operates through a
combination of congressional legislation and judge-made case law.28
Our copyright system, where two bodies of law share governance, can be
clunky at times, and can be susceptible to undue corporate influence.29
However, our system boasts comparative peacefulness and rigidity as
compared to the models—or lack thereof—in the Middle Ages, largely
thanks to the efforts of the founding fathers near the time of the United
States’ birth.30
1. Copyright Wars
In the middle of the sixth century, two would-be canonized saints
went to war against one another.31 Saint Columba, who studied under
Saint Finian, secretly got his hands on one of Saint Finian’s most prized
books.32 This book was the first Latin translation of the Bible to reach
Ireland.33 Saint Columba, a transcriber by profession, secretly copied the
entirety of the holy text for his own use.34 Saint Finian, enraged upon
discovering what his pupil had done, took the matter to King Diarmait
mac Cerbhiall, the High King of Ireland, for arbitration.35 “[Saint]
Finian’s argument was simple: My book. You can’t copy it. . . . [I]f
anyone was going to copy it . . . it should be done through certain
procedures and certainly not in secret under [my] own roof.”36 Saint
Columba argued that copying the book caused no damage.37 “‘It is not
right,’ he asserted, ‘that the divine words in that book should perish, or
that I or any other should be hindered from writing them or reading them
or spreading them among the tribes.’”38 Saint Columba believed that if

28. See generally Lawrence Lessig, Make Way for Copyright Chaos, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
18, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/opinion/18lessig.html.
29. See generally id.; see also infra Section I.A.2.
30. Infra Section I.A.3.
31. Ruth Suehle, The Story of St. Columba: A Modern Copyright Battle in Sixth
Century Ireland, OPENSOURCE.COM (June 9, 2011), https://opensource.com/law/11/6/story-stcolumba-modern-copyright-battle-sixth-century-ireland [https://perma.cc/MGT9-GCG9].
32. Id.
33. Greg McMullen, The History of Copyright, Part 1: The Battle of the Book,
ASCRIBE
(Mar.
9,
2015),
https://www.ascribe.io/our-radar/the-battle-of-the-book/
[https://perma.cc/6FAF-37GU].
34. Suehle, supra note 31.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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one owns knowledge through books, they have an obligation to spread
that knowledge, and to do otherwise is to commit a worse offense than
his unlicensed copying.39
The King disagreed, and reasoned that, “[t]o every cow belongs its
calf; to every book its copy.”40 Saint Columba rejected this ruling,
gathered an army, and led a rebellion against the King.41 The Battle of
Cúl Dreimhne—The Battle of the Books—ensued.42 Over 3000 of the
rebellion’s men died at the hands of the King, and the defeated Saint
Columba was sent into exile.43 Not only did Saint Columba lose the
physical battle, he also lost the philosophical battle against the concept
of copyright.44 While contemporary copyright disputes do not end up on
the battlefield, the same tensions run deep with stakeholders, who either
desire to have control and the value of their work protected, or wish to
see distribution of all intellectual works among the masses.45
2. Early American Copyright Law, the Framers’ Intent, and its
Effects on Mickey Mouse and the Present Day
The Framers first sought to strike a balance between the interests of
copyright holders and the general public by drafting copyright language
into the Constitution.46 The selected language, first proposed by James
Madison, reads “The Congress shall have [p]ower [t]o . . . promote the
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited [t]imes
to [a]uthors and [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their respective
[w]ritings and [d]iscoveries.”47 Thomas Jefferson proposed placing a
provision in the Bill of Rights, rather than codifying copyright
protections in Article I.48 Jefferson’s suggested language reads,

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id.
Id.
McMullen, supra note 33.
Id.
Id.; Suehle, supra note 31.
See Suehle, supra note 31.
McMullen, supra note 33.
See Copyright Timeline: A History of Copyright in the United States, ASS’N
RESEARCH LIBRARIES, http://www.arl.org/focus-areas/copyright-ip/2486-copyright-timeline
[https://perma.cc/9CSK-T3GQ].
47. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Thomas B. Nachbar, Patent and Copyright
Clause, HERITAGE FOUND., http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/46/
patent-and-copyright-clause [https://perma.cc/29VM-VX8V].
48. From Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, 28 August 1789, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-15-02-0354
[https://perma.cc/5LCPBEX4] [hereinafter FOUNDERS ONLINE].
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“[m]onopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in
literature and their own inventions in the arts for a term not exceeding
[undecided] years but for no longer term and no other purpose.”49 The
difference between these two provisions is that Jefferson’s version
would provide—had the specific number of years been decided upon—
an exact term length for a copyright.50
Madison’s version, which was included in the Constitution, left the
language more ambiguous, and gave Congress deference to decide—and
potentially later change—the length of a copyright.51 Had Jefferson’s
proposed language been used, it would have required the passage of a
constitutional amendment in order to change the length of a copyright.52
To be proposed, a constitutional amendment requires a two-thirds
majority vote in both houses of Congress, or two-thirds of state
legislatures to call for a constitutional convention.53 This level of
support is rare, and as a result, there have only been seventeen
amendments passed since the Bill of Rights was ratified.54
Over time, the duration of a basic copyright has steadily increased.55
In 1790, a copyright term lasted fourteen years with an optional
additional fourteen-year renewal.56 Over a century later, upon the
passage of the Copyright Act of 1909, the term had doubled to twentyeight years with an optional additional twenty-eight-year renewal.57
Shortly after, a character named Steamboat Willy emerged for the first
time and found his way into the hearts of Americans over the next half
century, with his moniker changing to a more recognizable name:
Mickey Mouse.58
Under the terms of the 1909 Act, Mickey Mouse’s copyright term

49. Id.
50. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, with FOUNDERS ONLINE, supra note 48.
51. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52. See Constitutional Amendment Process, NAT’L ARCHIVES, (Aug. 15, 2016),
https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/constitution
[https://perma.cc/BV5X-8BWR]
[hereinafter NAT’L ARCHIVES].
53. Id. None of the 27 amendments to the Constitution have been proposed by
constitutional convention. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Steve Schlackman, How Mickey Mouse Keeps Changing Copyright Law,
ARTREPRENEUR (Oct. 18, 2017), https://artrepreneur.com/how-mickey-mouse-keepschanging-copyright-law/ [https://perma.cc/QP56-THUC].
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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was set to expire in 1984.59 Disney owned the Mickey Mouse copyright
and feared its cash cow’s release into the public domain, which would
occur at the end of its copyright term.60 For this reason, the corporation
put forth a substantial lobbying campaign that urged for an extension of
copyright length.61 In 1976, an updated Copyright Act passed, and the
term for corporate copyrights was extended from fifty-six years to
seventy-five years.62 This kept Mickey Mouse safe until Disney’s new
copyright expiration date of 2003.63
As 2003 approached, Disney kept at their lobbying efforts, and five
years before Mickey Mouse’s release into the public domain, the Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 passed.64 Today,
copyrights for corporations are safe for ninety-five years, and Disney can
rest easy until Mickey Mouse’s next expiration date in 2023.65
This string of events highlights the difference between the Madison
model and Jefferson model of copyright protection. Given the difficulty
of passing a Constitutional amendment, it is unlikely that even a
corporation as powerful as Disney could have influenced two-thirds of
Congress or two-thirds of state legislatures into passing the multiple
Constitutional amendments needed to extend the copyright protection
term as long as it did.66
Similarly, the United States currently finds itself facing another
copyright conundrum—the choice being action or inaction through
legislation.67 Like the language differences between the Madison and
Jefferson models, this fork in the road will have serious implications on
the future of copyright law.

59. Id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See id. It was never explicitly stated by Congress that Disney’s efforts were
responsible for any of the copyright term extensions. Id. However, due to Disney’s lobbying
efforts, the public’s perception was that Disney was responsible. Id. The Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 was nicknamed the “Mickey Mouse Protection Act.”
Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1057, 1065 (2001).
66. See NAT’L ARCHIVES, supra note 52.
67. See The Authors Guild’s Top Legislative Priorities-2015, AUTHORS GUILD, 1–2
(2015), https://www.authorsguild.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-AG-Top-LegislativePriorities.3.23.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/FX9X-62L5].
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3. Federal Copyright Protection and Litigating Copyright Claims
“The necessity of extending to the creator of literary works a
suitable reward for his labors has long been recognized and cannot
seriously be questioned.”68 As such, literary works fall under the
safeguard of federal copyright protection.69 Owners of the copyright of
literary works have the exclusive rights to reproduce, sell, distribute, or
prepare derivative works of their copyrighted material.70 Further,
“[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright
owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”71 The law clearly aims to
establish protections for authors so they can continue to write, while
remaining protected from others infringing on their work for monetary
gain.72
From this protection, it naturally follows that the process for
copyright holders to seek redress for copyright infringement should be
both accessible and straightforward. However, this is not the case when
a copyright infringer is using a fair use defense.73 Fair use consists of
“four broad factors which guide whether the permission-less use of a
copyrighted work is fair. This means that fair use can evolve and change
over time; it also means that the only real way to find out if something is
‘fair use’ is to ask a federal court.”74 The Copyright Office seems to
agree, stating, “‘[t]he distinction between what is fair use and what is
infringement in a particular case will not always be clear or easily
defined.’”75 Indeed, “[t]he costs of obtaining counsel and maintaining a
copyright cause of action in federal court effectively precludes most
individual copyright owners whose works are clearly infringed from
being able to vindicate their rights and deter continuing violations.”76

68. Darrell L. Peck, Copyright-Infringement of Literary Works—An Elemental
Analysis, 38 MARQ. L. REV. 180, 180 (1955).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012).
70. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)–(3) (2012).
71. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2012).
72. See The Authors Guild’s Top Legislative Priorities-2015, supra note 67, at 1.
73. See Robinson Meyer, After 10 Years, Google Books Is Legal, ATLANTIC (Oct. 20,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/fair-use-transformative-levalgoogle-books/411058/ [https://perma.cc/2AA5-3VV7].
74. Id.
75. David Kravets, Fair Use Prevails as Supreme Court Rejects Google Books
Copyright Case, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 18, 2016, 11:17 AM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2016/04/fair-use-prevails-as-supreme-court-rejects-google-books-copyright-case/
[https://perma.cc/M6WM-BLTS].
76. The Authors Guild’s Top Legislative Priorities-2015, supra note 67 at 1.
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B. Mass Digitization
This section of the Note examines both the technology and the
intentions behind mass digitization.77
Continued technological
advancement encourages and challenges mass digitizers to increase
productivity, and in turn increase the humanitarian benefit associated
with digitizing.78
1. The Technology
For bulk home scanning, a Canon imageFormula DR-C225 was PC
Magazine’s editor’s choice in 2014.79 For $449, one can obtain this
device, which scans at a maximum rate of twenty-five pages per
minute.80 While this may sound fast, Google’s mass digitizing machines
are faster—four times faster.81 Google’s mass digitizing machines can
scan books at a breathtaking speed of 6000 pages per hour.82
Before Google patented a new system for scanning books, the
process of mass digitizing was tedious and often destroyed the book
being scanned.83 Mass digitizers had two options.84 They could press
the book flat using a glass plate, but this process is time consuming and
inefficient.85 Alternately, they could remove the binding from the
book—effectively destroying it.86 Google’s process utilizes air blowers
that turn pages, while infrared cameras take pictures of the pages.87 The
picture is then run through software that calculates the angle from which
the photograph was taken.88 Optical Character Recognition (OCR)
software then makes the text on the page of the book searchable by a

77. See infra Section I.B.1; see also infra Section I.B.2.
78. See infra Section I.B.1; infra Section I.B.2.
79. M. David Stone, Canon imageFormula DR-C225, PC MAG. (Nov. 24, 2014, 11:38
AM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2472494,00.asp [https://perma.cc/AY55-7FQ5].
80. Id.
81. See Heyman, supra note 18.
82. Id.
83. Maureen Clements, The Secret of Google’s Book Scanning Machine Revealed,
NPR (Apr. 30, 2009, 10:31 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/library/2009/04/
the_granting_of_patent_7508978.html [https://perma.cc/TZS4-JHBM].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Jeff Blagdon, Google Engineer Builds $1,500 Page-Turning Scanner Out of Sheet
Metal and a Vacuum, VERGE (Nov. 13, 2012, 12:10 AM), http://www.theverge.com/2012/11/
13/3639016/google-books-scanner-vacuum-diy [https://perma.cc/EZN5-7BH6].
88. Clements, supra note 83.
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computer user.89 Once the entire book has been scanned, a copy of the
book is completed, and a worker can place the next book in line on the
machine to be scanned.90
2. The Intentions
Conceptually, a universal library is a utopian concept.91 A
universal, digital library is “even better than any earlier thinker could
have imagined, because every work would be available to everyone,
everywhere, at all times.”92 However, not every mass digitizer intends to
operate on such a large scale.93 Mass digitization projects range in size,
from more than twenty-five million scanned works currently in the
Google Books collection,94 to projects with less than one percent of
Google Books scanned works.95
JSTOR, for example, takes a far more nuanced and careful approach
to mass digitizing than Google does.96 JSTOR’s primary focus is to
digitize the full run of journals, in some cases dating as far back as the
nineteenth century.97 Their approach is methodical: JSTOR sources
physical copies of journals from multiple libraries in order to ensure that
damaged or missing pages are accounted for.98
Similarly, in 2002, Stanford University undertook a mass
digitization effort.99 Stanford aimed to mass digitize all public domain

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Peter Singer, Google: A Universal Library?, AL JAZEERA (Apr. 15,
2011),
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/04/2011414112947284656.html
[https://perma.cc/DSN9-XBXF].
92. Id.
93. See Coyle, supra note 20, at 642.
94. See Heyman, supra note 18.
95. See Coyle, supra note 20, at 642. Microsoft will scan 100,000 “out-of-copyright
works for the British library.” Id.
96. JSTOR is a large digital library used by universities, public libraries, and private
individuals across the country. Mission and History, JSTOR, http://about.jstor.org/about
[https://perma.cc/3Y7B-JW87]; see also Coyle, supra note 20.
97. See Coyle, supra note 20, at 642.
98. Id. This approach is far more nuanced than Google’s. Id. There are online Internet
communities dedicated to uncovering and sharing Google’s various blunders and mistakes in
books that have undergone the mass digitization process. Kenneth Goldsmith, The Artful
Accidents of Google Books, NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/books/
page-turner/the-artful-accidents-of-google-books [https://perma.cc/B4R2-ZZQT].
“In
addition to hands and fingers, I found pages scanned through tissue paper, pages scanned
while mid-turn, and fold-out maps and diagrams scanned while folded . . . . The examples
were everywhere.” Id.
99. Coyle, supra note 20, at 642.
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books in its university library as such books are not protected under
copyright law.100 Stanford made use of both robotic scanners and
manual scanners in this endeavor, with the former being capable of
scanning 1500 pages per hour, and the latter merely 350 pages per
hour.101 Google absorbed this project in 2004, and the mission was
altered to include all of the books in the Stanford library—even those
with copyright protections—thus claiming fair use of their works.102
C. The Problem of Mass Digitization
There are two distinct issues facing mass digitization—logistics
surrounding the operation of digitizing efforts and consensus between
stakeholders.103 The following section discusses the factors that have
contributed to the existence of each issue.104
1. Mass Digitization as a Concept
The collision of three factors create the perceived problem with
mass digitization. First, mass digitization efforts involve a staggering
number of books.105 According to the United States Copyright Office,
inherent in the term “mass digitization” is the implication that the
“digital copying is so extensive as to make the individual clearance of
rights a practical impossibility.”106 Second, in order to get a license to
use a copyrighted work, direct contact with the copyright owner is
required.107 This is not always a simple process, especially if the owner
of a copyright is not readily accessible, or it is not apparent who the
copyright owner even is.108 Third, mass digitization is a popular idea.109

100. Id.
101. Equipment,
STANFORD
LIBRARIES,
https://library.stanford.edu/research/
digitization-services/labs/digital-production-group/equipment [https://perma.cc/6C28-EP2M].
102. Google Books, STANFORD LIBRARIES, https://library.stanford.edu/projects/googlebooks [https://perma.cc/5UL3-9TQY].
103. See infra Section 1.C.1; infra Subsections 1.C.2.a–e.
104. See infra Section 1.C.1; infra Subsections 1.C.2.a–e.
105. See Heyman, supra note 18. It is estimated that the number of scanned volumes
exceeds 25 million. Id.
106. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 73.
107. Can I Use Someone Else’s Work? Can Someone Else Use Mine?, U.S.
COPYRIGHT
OFFICE,
http://www.copyright.gov/help/faq/faq-fairuse.html#permission
[https://perma.cc/XG4X-F6J6].
108. Id. If a copyright was registered, renewed, or transferred before 1978, a manual
search of the Copyright Office’s records is required in order to determine ownership. See id.
The person seeking the copyright can either do it themselves in person or pay a fee for the
Copyright Office to conduct the search for them. See id.
109. See Heyman, supra note 18.
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In the Google case, the Department of Justice submitted an amicus brief
stating that, “[b]reathing life into millions of works that are now
effectively dormant, allowing users to search the text of millions of
books at no cost . . . and enhancing accessibility of such works for the
disabled and others are all worthy objectives.”110 In essence, the sum of
these factors is that mass digitization is a necessary process, but
currently lacks any sort of appropriate, surefire means of legal
operation.111
2. The Stakeholders
For the purpose of this discussion, stakeholders can be broken down
into five distinct groups: Congress, the judiciary, mass digitizers, content
creators, and content consumers.112 Unifying the conflicting voices that
emanate from each of the various stakeholders constitutes the crux of
moving forward with mass digitization.113
a.

Congress

Congressional inaction and gridlock negatively impact mass
digitization and the state of copyright law as a whole.114 Despite
Congress’s constitutional requirement to create and regulate copyright
law,115 it has shown no sign of looking into the mass digitization
problem.116 This is problematic because the longer Congress waits to
act, the longer the uncertainty regarding the state of the law will loom.117
b.

The judiciary

The judicial system has a long history of not wanting to get
involved in settling points of ambiguity within copyright law.118
Unsurprisingly, the temperament of the courts is no different regarding
mass digitization.119 In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court reasoned

110. See U.S. Statement of Interest, supra note 22, at 1.
111. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 72.
112. See generally, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24.
113. See id. at 74–75.
114. Transcript of Oral Argument, Authors Guild v. Google, 804 F.3d 202, 229 (2d
Cir. 2015) (on file with the Authors Guild).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
116. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 25, at 28.
117. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 77.
118. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003); see also Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 424 (1984).
119. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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“that it is generally for Congress, not the courts, to decide how best to
pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.”120 This was made evident in
the seminal mass digitization case, Authors Guild v. Google Inc.121
In 2005, the Authors Guild commenced litigation against Google’s
mass digitization project, Google Books.122 The Authors Guild was
unhappy that copyright holders were not being paid licensing fees or
receiving royalties for their works made available on Google Books.123
When the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York ruled on the case, the opinion made clear that “courts should
encroach only reluctantly on Congress’s legislative prerogative to
address copyright issues presented by technological developments:
‘[s]ound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to
Congress when major technological innovations alter the market for
copyrighted materials.’”124 Eventually, in 2015, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Google Books project fell within the
protection of the fair use doctrine.125 This opinion made no mention of
judicial deference, but was written by Judge Leval, who is known for a
renowned law review article that advocated for expanding the fair use
doctrine.126
c.

Mass digitizers

Above all, mass digitizers want certainty in the law.127 The Google
Books litigation lasted ten years, and during that time, Google slowed its
efforts to mass digitize every book because of the unstable state of the
law.128 Google would be engaging in mass digitization whether they had
to pay licensing fees to authors or not.129 In fact, in 2008, Google
attempted to settle with the Authors Guild and enter into a scheme
whereby authors would receive royalties and licensing payments for

120. Eldred, 537 U.S. at 212.
121. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
122. Where We Stand, Authors Guild v. Google, supra note 22.
123. Id.
124. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 680 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984)).
125. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 230 (2d Cir. 2015).
126. Meyer, supra note 73; see also Pierre N. Leval, Nimmer Lecture: Fair Use
Rescued, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1449, 1449 (1997).
127. See Jackson, supra note 16.
128. See id.
129. See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 672.
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usage of their books.130 The court’s rejection of this settlement was the
only factor keeping this arrangement from becoming a reality.131
Although the District Court disallowed the proposed settlement,
Circuit Judge Denny Chin believed conceptually in the Google Books
project.132 Judge Chin has commented on Google’s vision, stating that
“all society benefits.”133 Ultimately, Google, and all other mass
digitizers alike, seek clarity in the law outside of the Second Circuit in
order to deliver a product that is beneficial to the greater good.134
d.

Content creators

Content creators wish to be compensated for the use of their works
in mass digitization projects.135 The Authors Guild explains:
Authors rely on licensing revenues . . . to support their ability to write;
and, in the case of Google Book Search, authors are not only losing
fees that Google should be paying for copying and making their
works available, but they are also losing immeasurable income from
lost sales. This is because researchers can usually find all they need
from a book through Google Book Search.136

Writers have been making their living writing professionally for
several hundred years.137 It naturally follows that with such a timehonored tradition, a new advancement like mass digitization—which
uses an author’s work without compensation—would be met with
skepticism by authors.138 In a very real sense, the livelihood of authors
depends upon precedent set by the treatment of their works as society
transitions into the digital age.139 Many authors are excited by the
prospect of their out-of-print works being exposed to new audiences
through mass digitization, but if a mass digitization solution is not

130. Id.
131. See id. at 686.
132. Claire Cain Miller & Julie Bosman, Siding with Google, Judge Says Book Search
Does Not Infringe Copyright, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/
15/business/media/judge-sides-with-google-on-book-scanning-suit.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2018).
133. Id.
134. See id.
135. See The Authors Guild’s Top Legislative Priorities-2015, supra note 67, at 1.
136. Id.
137. Pat Rogers, The First Professional Author, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1988, at A.12,
PROQUEST, Doc. No. 426711230.
138. See generally The Authors Guild’s Top Legislative Priorities-2015, supra note 67.
139. See id. at 2.
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carefully implemented by Congress, it could do more harm than good to
authors.140
e.

Content consumers

Content consumers are the clear beneficiaries of any mass
digitization project.141 Google Books allows readers to find literature
that they otherwise would not find.142 Approximately eighty-five
percent of the books available on Google Books are now out of print.143
Courts that handled the Google litigation, the Department of Justice, the
Authors Guild, and Google itself all feel that the Google Books project is
of great public utility.144
One concern that the Authors Guild raises about the Google Books
venture is that it feels that the project represents a “redistribution of
wealth from the creative sector to the tech sector.”145 In other words,
society is ignoring the needs of authors in favor of technological
advancement.146 The Authors Guild warns that if authors are not fairly
compensated for their written works, it could create a chilling effect on
the production of new works in the future.147 If this happens, content
consumers will lose out in the long run because fewer works will be
created.148
D. The Fair Use Standard
1. What is Fair Use?
Fair use is defined as the “reproduction [of a copyrighted
work] . . . for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research.”149 If secondary usage falls into one of these categories, it is
not an infringement on the copyright.150 These terms are broad, but they

140. See id.
141. See Adam Liptak & Alexandra Alter, Challenge to Google Books Is Declined by
Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/19/
technology/google-books-case.html.
142. Id.
143. Jackson, supra note 16.
144. See Where We Stand, Authors Guild v. Google, supra note 22.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Id.
149. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2015).
150. Id.
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are qualified by a further balancing test that takes the interests of both
secondary users and copyright holders into account.151
In determining whether a “criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching, scholarship, or research” usage is fair use, courts examine four
factors.152 First, courts examine the purpose and nature of the use.153
Courts are more likely to deem nonprofit or educational purposes to be
fair use as opposed to commercial use.154 Second, courts look at the
“nature of the copyrighted work.”155 Novels and fictional universes
being utilized by someone without the copyright stand a lesser chance at
surviving a fair use analysis than a factual piece or news article.156
Third, courts examine the “amount and substantiality of the portion used
in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”157 If a court sees “a
large portion of the copyrighted work” being appropriated into the
secondary use, it is less likely to be deemed fair use.158 Fourth, courts
look at the effect on the market value of a copyrighted work if a
secondary usage is to be allowed.159 If a use will hurt the market for the
existing piece, the court will be more likely to object to allowing the new
usage under the fair use doctrine.160 In addition to these four factors,
courts look at whether a usage is transformative.161 If a new user adds a
new element that alters the work in a way that gives it new life or
usefulness, the court may find that the use is fair.162
2. Transformative Use and the Google Books Litigation
After acknowledging that there was no Congressional input on the
subject, the Second Circuit held in Google that the Google Books project
was a transformative use under the fair use doctrine.163 “Transformative
uses are those that add something new, with a further purpose or
different character, and do not substitute for the original use of the

151. See More Information on Fair Use, U.S. COPYRIGHT
http://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/more-info.html [https://perma.cc/7STD-P9G3].
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 212 (2d Cir. 2015).
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work.”164 One key component of the Google Books project is that
through OCR technology, the text is made searchable.165 A user can run
a search on the Google website, and yield results from the contents of
books available on Google Books.166 However, the result will be a
“snippet” of text from the book, as the entire book is not viewable.167
In deciding that this system constituted transformative use under the
fair use doctrine, the Second Circuit looked to an earlier decision
involving the same issues: Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust.168 The
project in HathiTrust was a mass digitization endeavor similar to Google
Books.169 The court held that it is fair use “to create a full-text
searchable database of copyrighted works and to provide those works in
formats accessible to those with disabilities.”170 One would assume that
stare decisis would be applicable here; however, the distinguishing factor
between HathiTrust and Google is that in HathiTrust, the mass digitizers
were a conglomerate of nonprofit universities.171 Google, of course, is a
for-profit corporation.172
For this reason, when arguing against the Google Books project, the
Authors Guild attempted to claim that, “Google is profit-motivated and
seeks to use its dominance of book search to fortify its overall
dominance of the Internet search market, and that thereby Google
indirectly reaps profits from the Google Books functions.”173 However,
Google has structured Google Books in such a way whereby it does not
make any profit directly from the project.174 The court was not swayed
by these commercialism arguments though, citing prior Supreme Court
precedent that, “the more transformative the new work, the less will be
the significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh
against a finding of fair use.”175 Here, the indirect commercialism was

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
2014).
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
(1994)).

More Information on Fair Use, supra note 151.
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 216.
Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 216–17; see also Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir.
HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 97.
Id. at 105.
Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 217.
Id.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 207.
Id. at 219 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578
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not able to trump the transformative nature of searchable snippets.176
II.

CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION TO RECONCILE THE NEEDS OF
STAKEHOLDERS

A legislative solution is needed to bring mass digitization projects
fully into the mainstream culture of the United States.177 This part of the
Note addresses three potential legislative models and examines, through
case studies, their level of applicability to the United States.178 Evidence
compels the conclusion that legislation mirroring an extended collective
licensing model is the best way forward for mass digitization.179
A. A Legislative Solution to the Mass Digitization Problem
The mass digitization problem will not gracefully resolve itself if
left to the discretion of courts.180 The Supreme Court has denied the
Authors Guild’s writ of certiorari in the Google case.181 This eliminates
any possibility of binding judicial authority uniformly issuing a set of
rules for mass digitization projects.182 Congress is the only other body
with the authority to regulate copyright law, and the only body expressly
allowed to do so by the Constitution.183 Thus, setting out rules
governing mass digitization is an appropriate and necessary duty within
the purview of Congress.184 Courts have been insistent about Congress
taking on this responsibility; however, so far, Congress is not even
examining passing a bill addressing mass digitization.185 The legislative
branch has gained a reputation for its inaction in the realm of copyright
law—most strikingly regarding orphan works.186 In order for mass
digitization projects to reach their fullest potential, Congress must work

176. Id.
177. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 72.
178. See infra Section II.A.2.
179. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 83; infra Subsection II.A.2.c.
180. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 77; see also infra Subsection
II.A.2.c.
181. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1658, 1658 (2016).
182. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 77.
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
184. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 72.
185. Id. at 128.
186. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 25, at 28. “Is anything done in
Congress these days? How long would it take reasonably for this to be resolved in Congress?
Even the issue of orphan books has been percolating in Congress for years and years.” Id.
Orphan works are copyrighted material whose owner is unknown or impossible to identify or
contact. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 1.
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to pass governing laws.187
1. The Insufficiency of the Fair Use Doctrine
In June of 2015, the United States Copyright Office issued a report
on mass digitization, laying out recommendations for potential solutions
that address the wants and needs of stakeholders in mass digitization
projects.188 One solution that the report addresses is for Congress to not
act.189 Skeptics of legislation, such as the Library Copyright Alliance,
argue that the fair use doctrine is a sufficient defense for mass
digitizers.190 Indeed, if usage falls into one of the categories of the fair
use doctrine, as previously defined, that usage is not an infringement of
copyright.191
However, this is not a sufficient system. Google wishes to mass
digitize every book in existence.192 Only about twenty percent of the
world’s books are in the public domain.193 This means “the vast
majority of all titles” are still under copyright.194 Since Google does not
negotiate licensing terms with any individual authors, roughly eighty
percent of their digital collection is unlicensed.195 With so many
unlicensed works, the lion’s share of Google Books’ relevance depends
upon the fair use doctrine.196 This is a tenuous position for any mass
digitizer, and currently, only the Second Circuit has a touchstone holding
in place to give mass digitizers an idea as to where they stand.197
However, the decisions of the Second Circuit are in no way binding on
other district or circuit courts outside of the Second Circuit, and
definitely not the Supreme Court.198 This leaves mass digitizers from
different circuits without binding guidance.199

187. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 76.
188. See generally id.
189. Id. at 76.
190. Id.
191. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2015).
192. Heyman, supra note 18.
193. Jackson, supra note 16.
194. Id. “About [ten] to [fifteen] percent of these books are [still] in print.” Id. The
rest are out of print, and Google Books is working to make them accessible once more. Id.
This is perhaps the most significant public policy reason for encouraging mass digitization
projects. See id.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. See generally Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015).
198. See Precedent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
199. See id.
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In the Google case, the search giant’s mass digitization project
ultimately prevailed on fair use grounds.200 However, it took Google a
decade, untold millions of dollars, and several appeals to achieve that
verdict.201 Further, the Google decision was extremely fact specific, and
such decisions “do not extend to the wider dissemination of copyrighted
works without permission or compensation.”202 There is an inherent
cost, risk, unpredictability, and time commitment involved with any fair
use defense, and this shaky legal ground results in the deprivation of art
for the public.203
Additionally, fair use as a defense for mass digitizers ignores the
interests of content creators.204 As discussed previously, authors rely
upon licensing revenues in order to survive.205 Because of this, from a
public policy standpoint, the system for mass digitization should
“[allow] authors to control use of their works and obtain compensation
for the use as an incentive to write.”206
Mass digitizers tend to be large corporations or universities, whereas
authors are generally individuals with far more modest means.207 Not
only are mass digitizers better positioned to pay license fees, they are
also choosing to become a part of this industry, whereas authors’ works
become digitized without their prior consent.208
It would be
fundamentally unfair to force average authors to yield potential revenue
streams to corporations and universities.209 In a settlement agreement
that the court later rejected in Google, the Authors Guild and Google
agreed upon a scheme in which Google would pay licensing fees to
authors.210 This shows mass digitizers’ willingness to pay fees for the
copyrighted books that compose their digital library, and represents a

200. Authors Guild, 804 F.3d at 202.
201. See Where We Stand, Authors Guild v. Google, supra note 22.
202. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 76.
203. See Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 356 (2012). In a majority opinion discussion
on orphan works, Justice Brennan highlights the negative effects of the fair use defense
without an accompanying legislative aid for curators. Id. “[The] Los Angeles Public Library
has been unable to make its collection of Mexican folk music publicly available because of
problems locating copyright owners, [and] a Jewish cultural organization has abandoned
similar efforts to make available Jewish cultural music and other materials . . . .” Id.
204. Where We Stand, Authors Guild v. Google, supra note 22.
205. See The Authors Guild’s Top Legislative Priorities-2015, supra note 67, at 1.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. Authors Guild v. Google Inc. 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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fair compromise between stakeholders.211
Another point of concern regarding fair use in mass digitization
cases is that it “turn[s] copyright on its head.”212 Traditionally, “while
copyright is a system of ex ante permissions, mass digitization comes
with a compelling demand to revert copyright into an opt-out regime.”213
In copyright law, the copyright holder ordinarily has the right to choose
who can make use of their work.214 Instead, under the fair use defense,
mass digitizers take copyright from an ex post perspective.215 Authors
are forced to take their own affirmative steps if they wish to contest use
by mass digitizers.216
This, the court in Google reasoned, is
“incongruous with the purpose of the copyright laws.”217 Rather than
expand the fair use doctrine, which subverts the norms of copyright law,
allowing Congress to legislate is the more sensible option.218
Overall, the fair use doctrine is wide-ranging and could provide
some protection for mass digitizers219—after all, it ultimately protected
Google Books220—however, “any rule that privileges flexibility
necessarily produces unpredictability.”221 The Copyright Office agrees,
as evidenced in its July 2015 report, and given these factors, advocates
for a legislative solution to the mass digitization problem in addition to
the existing fair use defense.222
2. Picking a Legislative Solution
The Copyright Office sees the compelling public policy benefits of
mass digitization.223 Moving forward, the office envisions a statutory
system where mass digitizers can curate their collections and creators

211.
212.

See id. at 672.
See, e.g., U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 74 (quoting MAURIZIO
BORGHI & STAVROULA KARAPAPA, COPYRIGHT AND MASS DIGITIZATION: A CROSS
JURISDICTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2013)).
213. Id.
214. See id.
215. See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
216. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 74.
217. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
218. Id. at 680.
219. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383, 1410 (2014).
220. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 206 (2d Cir. 2015).
221. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 74.
222. Id. at 78.
223. Id. at 73–74.
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can be appropriately compensated for the use of their works.224 In their
June 2015 report, the Copyright Office compares three different models
in making its recommendation.225 These models are direct licensing,
voluntary collective licensing, and extended collective licensing.226
a.

Direct licensing

A direct licensing model is a statutory framework that would require
mass digitizers and authors to negotiate, or otherwise agree upon,
licensing rates.227 For example, authors often elect to utilize direct
licensing when listing their works for sale on Amazon.228 The popular
“Look Inside the Book” feature allows authors to permit Amazon to
display portions of the book as a scanned document to potential
consumers before purchase.229 A digital portion of the book is only
displayed if the author permits it.230 This amounts to a direct license
given to Amazon by authors to digitize an author’s work for promotional
purposes.231
From a practical standpoint, direct licensing could not viably
transition to mass digitization.232 The Copyright Office defines mass
digitization as “projects in which the scale of digital copying is so
extensive as to make the individual clearance of rights a practical
impossibility.”233 In the case of “Look Inside the Book,” Amazon is
individually clearing rights.234 With twenty-five million scanned
works—and a portion of them being orphan works where the copyright
holder is unable to be located—this is an unfeasible avenue for larger
digitization projects like Google Books.235
224. Id.
225. See id. at 79–82.
226. Id.
227. See Look Inside the Book (LITB) Program, AMAZON, https://www.amazon.com/
gp/feature.html?docId=1001119971 [https://perma.cc/UK3C-2GC3] (follow link to print book
FAQ).
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 73.
233. Id.
234. See Look Inside the Book, supra note 227.
235. Heyman, supra note 18 (Google has digitized twenty-five million books); Michael
Hiltzik, Copyright Boon or Bane? Google Books Survives Another Legal Challenge, L.A.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2015, 2:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-googlebooks-survives-another-legal-challenge-20151020-column.html
[https://perma.cc/3WXW5Y66] (stating that a portion of these twenty-five million books are orphan works); see
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Voluntary collective licensing

A voluntary collective licensing model (VCL) differs from a direct
licensing model because in a VCL model, individual users rely upon a
Copyright Management Organization (CMO) to handle licensing and
royalties for content creators.236 Under a VCL model, an individual
copyright holder can request that a management organization protect
their work.237 CMOs are comprised of many copyright owners, and all
copyright owners pay a fee to fund their particular umbrella
organization.238 For purposes of mass digitization, the most efficient
system would involve a CMO for each particular medium that would
make deals with mass digitizers on behalf of all their members.239 This
would ensure that authors are paid licensing fees; however, the model
hinges on the authors making the affirmative decision to become a
member of a management organization.240
Therefore, the downfall of a congressionally mandated opt-in
scheme is that many, if not most, authors would either not know or
simply not go through the process of opting-in.241 Ultimately, this
greatly limits the scope of works available for mass digitization
projects.242 Inherent in the term “mass,” the quantity of materials is king
in these projects.243 Thus, voluntary collective licensing falls short as an
optimal legislative solution.
c.

Extended collective licensing

Ultimately, an extended collective licensing (ECL) system is the
best statutory framework for the United States copyright system.244 In
an ECL system:
[T]he government [would] authorize[] a collective organization to
negotiate licenses for a particular class of works (e.g., textbooks,
newspapers, and magazines) or a particular class of uses (e.g.,

Jackson, supra note 16 (discussing why it is infeasible for Google Books to individually
negotiate licensing terms with authors).
236. See Meghan Dougherty, Voluntary Collective Licensing: The Solution to the
Music Industry’s File Sharing Crisis?, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 405, 415 (2006).
237. See id. at 409.
238. Id.
239. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 81.
240. Id. at 80.
241. Id. at 82.
242. Id. at 80.
243. See Heyman, supra note 18.
244. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 82.
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reproduction of published works for educational or scientific
purposes). When the collective negotiates a license with a particular
user that license is automatically extended—by operation of law—to
all of the rights owners for those works, regardless of whether they
belong to the collective organization or not.245

An ECL model is desirable over a voluntary collective license
model because rather than the VCL’s requirement to opt-in, ECL
requires authors to opt-out—meaning they are automatically involved
unless the copyright holder individually objects.246 This guarantees
strength in numbers for the purpose of bargaining with mass digitizers,
while at the same time ensuring the maximum pool of works for mass
digitizers to draw from.247
Overall, an ECL model is an optimal compromise between major
stakeholders.248 This is evidenced by the proposed Google settlement,
which closely mirrored an ECL system.249 Under the terms of the
settlement, the Authors Guild would represent the interests of copyright
holders in licensing negotiations with Google—including all authors
who did not affirmatively opt-out of the arrangement.250
Because of the actors involved in this proposed settlement, the terms
of the proposed settlement are a significant indicator of what
stakeholders want.251 “The Authors Guild is the nation’s oldest and
largest professional organization for writers.”252 Alphabet, which owns
Google, is the second largest company in the world.253 These two
parties, who found themselves diametrically opposed in a decade-long
court battle, came to the mutual consensus that an ECL model is in both

245. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, LEGAL ISSUES IN MASS DIGITIZATION: A PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION DOCUMENT 35 (2011), https://www.copyright.gov/docs/
massdigitization/USCOMassDigitization_October2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KTW-KP2G].
246. Id. at 36.
247. See About Us, AM. SOC’Y COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, & PUBLISHERS,
http://www.ascap.com/about [https://perma.cc/9WDV-XF37]; see also LEGAL ISSUES IN
MASS DIGITIZATION, supra note 245, at 35.
248. See Authors Guild v. Google Inc., 770 F. Supp. 2d 666, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
249. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 83.
250. See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677.
251. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 83.
252. Who We Are, AUTHORS GUILD, https://www.authorsguild.org/who-we-are/
[https://perma.cc/6QH5-AJ3T].
253. Top Companies in the World by Market Value 2017, STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/263264/top-companies-in-the-world-by-market-value/
[https://perma.cc/QU4G-GQZ9].
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of their best interests.254
B. The Compatibility of Collective Licensing Models with Creative
Works
There is longstanding precedent for voluntary collective licensing
providing protection from infringement in creative industries.255 VCL is
analogous to ECL, which the Copyright Office recommends for mass
digitization when it comes to the enforcement of copyright.256 The only
difference is that VCL is an opt-in model rather than an opt-out
model;257 however, members in either model would still enjoy increased
collective bargaining and copyright enforcement strength.258 Therefore,
examining the copyright enforcement strength of already-implemented
VCL models is informative as to the effectiveness of ECL models.259
This section will reference successful VCL models to achieve such an
end.
1. The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
as a Model
The American Society of Composers, Authors, and Publishers
(ASCAP) is a VCL organization in the music industry.260 ASCAP
collects licensing fees on behalf of over 700,000 music-industry
members directly from radio stations, bars, theme parks, and other
organizations that use ASCAP members’ works.261 It is a very efficient
organization—despite an overhead large enough to support hundreds of
thousands of members—eighty-eight cents of every dollar goes directly

254. See Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 677. In the end, the court denied this
settlement. Id. at 678. It was rejected primarily because the court felt uncomfortable allowing
private parties to come to an agreement that had a direct effect upon authors who were not a
part of the suit. Id. at 677. The court felt that the proposed settlement would give an unfair
competitive advantage to Google, and create a limited monopoly. Id. at 685.
255. See About Us, supra note 247; About, BROADCAST MUSIC, INC.,
http://www.bmi.com/about [https://perma.cc/35GH-PT2Z] (founded in 1939); About,
COPYRIGHT CLEARANCE CTR., http://www.copyright.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/F5CNRN5B] (founded in 1978).
256. Authors Guild, 770 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
257. Id. at 79–82.
258. Id. at 79.
259. See id.
260. About Us, supra note 247.
261. ASCAP Payment System, AM. SOC’Y COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, & PUBLISHERS,
http://www.ascap.com/members/payment/whocollect.aspx [https://perma.cc/DM3E-CNYQ].

112

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:85

back to members.262
Due to the size and strength of ASCAP, the organization is able to
use the legal system to collect money for individual artists in ways that
most artists would be unable to accomplish alone.263 Broadcast Music
Inc., a rival performance rights organization to ASCAP, files between 75
and 125 copyright infringement lawsuits annually, while ASCAP often
files triple that figure.264 Performance rights organizations (PMOs), like
ASCAP, send out demand letters seeking compensation, and most
businesses opt to comply and pay licensing fees rather than face these
lawsuits in court.265 These are services sorely needed by professional
authors.266
In describing the lives of professional authors, the Authors Guild
says, “[m]ost of our members live on the edge of being able to keep
writing or find other paying work.”267 Authors themselves generally do
not have the necessary funds to fight for their rights against copyright
violators;268 the Authors Guild has been responsible for filing both major
court cases involving mass digitization projects—HathiTrust and
Google.269
However, sometimes this protection is taken too far. ASCAP has
proven itself so effective in upholding the rights of their members that it
has a reputation as being draconian.270 The zealousness of privatized,

262. ASCAP Advantage, AM. SOC’Y COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, & PUBLISHERS,
http://www.ascap.com/about/ascapadvantage.aspx [https://perma.cc/VZW2-9Q6V].
263. See id.
264. See id.
265. See, e.g., 11 Questions About Music Licensing, NAT’L RESTAURANT ASS’N,
http://www.restaurant.org/Manage-My-Restaurant/Operations/Regulatory-back-office/11questions-about-music-licensing [https://perma.cc/Q4VF-BEJY].
266. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 83.
267. Id. at 2.
268. See Second Circuit Leaves Authors High and Dry, AUTHORS GUILD (Oct. 16,
2015), https://www.authorsguild.org/industry-advocacy/2nd-circuit-leaves-authors-high-anddry/ [https://perma.cc/SF4W-R99C]. “Most full-time authors live on the perilous edge of
being able to sustain themselves through writing as a profession[.]” Id.
269. See Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 202–03 (2d Cir. 2015); Authors
Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014).
270. See, e.g., Ari Herstand, ASCAP, BMI and SESAC Force Local Coffee Shop to Shut
Down Live Music, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Oct. 29, 2014), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
2014/10/29/ascap-bmi-sesac-force-local-coffee-shop-shut-live-music/
[https://perma.cc/
HA27-6VAC]. This article chronicles a small Missouri coffee shop that held around twelve
open-mic concerts annually. Id. While proceeds from these events were donated mostly to
charity, and no admission was charged, PMOs demanded licensing fees be paid for the use of
their artists’ songs. Id. Ultimately, the shop was faced with the choice of paying $2100 in
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non-government regulated rights organizations can violate public policy
and upset people.271 Perhaps most famously, ASCAP solicited licensing
fees from the Girl Scouts of America for songs they sang at camp.272
The format of ASCAP is distinguishable from an ECL model in a
way that ensures this kind of zealotry would not come to pass.273 CMOs
would neither act like, nor be perceived as, ravenous draconian rights
organizations.274 This is because inherent in a statutory ECL model is
government oversight.275 The Copyright Office itself would oversee all
CMOs, and ensure “standards of transparency, accountability, and good
governance in [their] operations.”276 ASCAP, as a private limited
liability corporation, has no such oversight in place,277 and thus, would
be less concerned by public image because their existence does not
depend upon favorability.278 In addition to oversight by the Copyright
Office over CMOs, the finances and operations of the CMOs would be
subject to auditing by rights-holders.279 CMOs would experience
pressure from the top-down as well as from the bottom-up. 280 The
resulting effect would be equilibrium between the interests of CMOs in
retaining their status, and the interest of rights-holders in being delivered
the licensing fees they deserve.281
2. The Success of Collective Licensing Internationally
This section of the Note examines case studies of different licensing

licensing fees to three PMOs, or cease live music events. Id. The shop no longer holds
concerts. Id.
271. Id.
272. Elisabeth Bumiller, ASCAP Asks Royalties from Girl Scouts, and Regrets It, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1996, at 1, PROQUEST, Doc. No. 430710696.
273. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 91 (explaining that CMOs would
be checked by government oversight and adhere to high transparency standards).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 92.
276. Id. at 90.
277. N.Y. DEPT. OF STATE, DIV. OF CORPS. ENTITY INFO., ASCAP ENTERPRISES, LLC,
https://appext20.dos.ny.gov/corp_public/CORPSEARCH.ENTITY_INFORMATION?p_toke
n=7631844C71A767FD8FD0FC043DB3CB5D10F64792D798AFD3B2AECB2BCE167E899
96E8AB4339C9D5BAC8FB8DC9958540C&p_nameid=ED9AA2B522E27542&p_corpid=3
9C38C4464209C86&p_captcha=19539&p_captcha_check=87B579FFB959DA65&p_entity_
name=Ascap%20enterprises%20LLC&p_name_type=A&p_search_type=BEGINS&p_srch_r
esults_page=0 [https://perma.cc/LE3Y-K6CB].
278. Id.; see also Bumiller, supra note 272. Stakeholders in the music industry refer to
ASCAP as “an obnoxious foe”; however, the organization remains the largest music licensing
entity in the world. Id.
279. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 92.
280. Id. at 91–92.
281. See id.

114

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:85

models used internationally.282 These case studies supplement the prior
discussion of ASCAP in demonstrating the effectiveness of an extended
collective licensing model.283
a.

Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society

The Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS) is a private
VCL organization in the United Kingdom that collects licensing fees on
behalf of authors across Europe.284 This organization has been
successful throughout its forty year history, and has collected over
£450,000,000 for its members.285 ALCS is based upon a VCL model,
but it contains elements of ECL.286 The ALCS trawls to collect licensing
fees on behalf of nonmembers, and their website has a search feature so
authors can see if the ALCS is holding onto licensing fees from one of
their titles.287 If an author wishes to collect on their earnings and is not a
member, the author can pay a one-time fee of thirty-six pounds to
become a member.288 The success of this model speaks volumes for the
potential success of ECL in the United States, because it has the same
goal—remuneration for authors—and utilizes a quasi-opt-out system of
achieving that end.289
The proposed American ECL model would be distinguishable from
the ALCS model in the way that membership fees are handled.290 ALCS
has authors pay a fee up-front for membership, whereas ECL would
deduct fees from royalty payouts.291 As ECL is an opt-out model, this
prevents authors uninterested in mass digitization from having a new tax
levied against them in the form of a CMO membership fee.292 It is also
an attempt to ensure that authors are paying fees proportional to the
amount of royalties that their works are generating.293 The ALCS’s VCL
model, while not completely compatible with mass digitization, provides

282. See infra Subsections II.B.2.a–b.
283. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 98–99.
284. See How ALCS is Run, AUTHORS’ LICENSING & COLLECTING SOC’Y,
https://www.alcs.co.uk/how-alcs-is-run [https://perma.cc/6U7D-X4X7].
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. Royalty
Search,
AUTHORS’
LICENSING
&
COLLECTING
SOC’Y,
https://www.alcs.co.uk/royalty-search [https://perma.cc/J5ZK-KXUB].
288. Terms and Conditions of Membership, ALCS, https://www.alcs.co.uk/terms-andconditions-of-membership.
289. What We Do, ALCS, https://www.alcs.co.uk/what-we-do.
290. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 98–99.
291. See id.
292. See id. at 93, 98–99.
293. See id. at 99.
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a guiding light to the burgeoning American ECL model.294
b.

Extended collective licensing internationally

At least twenty countries currently employ mass licensing ECL
models,295 generally “to facilitate uses that are considered socially
beneficial but for which the costs of obtaining rights on an individual
basis may be prohibitively high.”296 France and Germany both have
CMOs overseen by government agencies, which collectively license outof-print books.297 These initiatives are particularly relevant to mass
digitization because almost eighty-five percent of all works digitized by
Google Books are out of print, and thus would be covered by the French
and German legislation.298
In Nordic countries, ECL models have been used for several
decades.299 Their ECL models do not apply specifically to published
books, but rather fields such as radio, television, educational materials,
photocopying, and visual arts.300 CMOs in these countries negotiate
licensing schemes directly with archives.301 Mass digitization efforts
function as an archive, thus a Nordic CMO representing a published
literary would have the government-sponsored authority to negotiate
with mass digitizers.302 In fact, in a country such as Hungary, the
mediums legally allowed to form CMOs are not limited in any
capacity.303 Should the need arise, these countries could elect to
implement ECLs for authors of literary works at any point.304
C. Addressing Counterarguments to American ECL
This section serves to address common counterarguments for
legislating to facilitate mass digitization. Specifically, the ability for
authors to opt out, the security standards of digitized documents, and the
misconception that mass digitizers will suffer from legislation because of

294. See id. at 18.
295. Id. at 22 (citing Kerstin Herlt, ACE Survey on the Implementation of the Orphan
Works Directive, FORWARD (Apr. 3, 2015), http://project-forward.eu/2015/04/03/acesurvey-on-the-implementation-of-the-orphan-works-directive/).
296. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 19.
297. See id. app. F, at 4–5.
298. See Jackson, supra note 16.
299. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 18.
300. See id. app. F, at 7–8.
301. See id. at 19.
302. See Coyle, supra note 20.
303. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, app. F, at 6.
304. See id.
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the imposition of licensing fees.
1. Compulsory Participation
Skeptics of ECL legislation fear the consequences for authors who
wish to negotiate with potential licensees themselves, rather than being
represented through a CMO.305 An essential provision to this legislation
would be the ability for any author to opt out—meaning participation in
ECLs would not be compulsory.306 The inclusion of an opt-out
provision ensures that authors can negotiate for themselves instead of
using a CMO.307 This proposed legislation utilizes an opt-out model so
that mass digitizers have the largest possible pool of works to draw from,
but the system would not be reliant on every author remaining a part of
their CMO.308 Most authors would be happy getting any licensing fees,
as the fair use doctrine currently allows mass digitizers to withhold
royalties entirely.309 Further, many authors would welcome the
collective bargaining strength that would come with being part of a
CMO.310 So long as an intuitive opt-out provision exists, no author’s
rights or interests will be infringed by this proposed legislation.311
2. Wariness Towards Mass Digitization Due to Document Security
Concerns
Skeptics, such as June Besek at the Kernochan Center, are
concerned about the security of mass digitized collections.312 The illegal
downloading and subsequent distribution of mass digitized documents
are a valid concern.313 If digitizers are not diligent in implementing
adequate security measures in their collection, artists may face real harm
in the form of lost revenue.314 This is a legitimate threat, as illegal
downloading and file sharing on the Internet is still on the rise.315

305. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 93.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. See Second Circuit Leaves Authors High and Dry, supra note 268.
310. See, e.g., Jordan Melnick, Think Twice Before Pushing Play, QSR
https://www2.qsrmagazine.com/articles/exclusives/1209/copyright-1.phtml (last visited Oct.
3, 2016).
311. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 93.
312. Id. at 75 n.305.
313. See id.
314. See id.
315. Robert Steele, If You Think Piracy Is Decreasing, You Haven’t Looked at the
Data . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (July 16, 2015), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2015/07/
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However, there is a sense of futility involved with attempting to protect
any media that the public desires, and the examples are plentiful.316 The
Oscar-winning film The Revenant was leaked online days before it was
even released in theaters.317 J.D. Salinger’s Three Stories includes a
sought-after tale chronicling the early lives of characters from The
Catcher in the Rye.318 It was not to be released until 2051 but was
leaked as a perfect-quality scanned digital document.319 It seems, in a
way, that no media is safe from the clutches of a motivated digital
pirate.320
The best that an ECL model can strive for is to increase document
security standards, and this is exactly what the (proposed) legislation
would accomplish.321 Right now, no statutes or other mandatory rules
govern mass digitization procedures.322 An ECL statute would include a
requirement that mass digitizers agree to uphold reasonable security
measures.323 This is not a perfect solution to end document piracy, but it
is a baseline standard that mass digitizers would be accountable for
adhering to.324 Therefore, legislation would be a step in the right
direction for the security of mass-digitized documents.
3.

Mass Digitizers Would Suffer Undue Harm Due to Legislation

An ECL model would not unduly cripple organizations interested in
becoming mass digitizers. Opponents of an ECL model argue that many
works in mass digitization projects are orphan works, so their unknown
authors would never collect on the licensing fees that a CMO negotiates
for them.325 Because of this, they allege it would place an undue burden

16/if-you-think-piracy-is-decreasing-you-havent-looked-at-the-data-2/
[https://perma.cc/
QUG8-4C74].
316. See id.
317. Andrew Blake, Movie Pirate Hit with $1.2 Million Fine for Leaking ‘The
Revenant’ Prior to
Film’s Release,
WASH. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/30/movie-pirate-hit-with-12-million-finefor-leaking-/ [https://perma.cc/Y6PS-57RU].
318. Jamie Condliffe, Read These 3 Unpublished JD Salinger Stories That Just Leaked
Online, GIZMODO (Nov. 28, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://gizmodo.com/read-these-3-unpublishedjd-salinger-stories-that-just-1473100222 [https://perma.cc/YF8M-PGGF].
319. Id.
320. See generally id.; see also Blake, supra note 317.
321. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 98.
322. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
323. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 98.
324. See id.
325. Jeff Kaplan, Our Comments on Copyright Office Recommendations for Mass
Digitization: No Extended Collective Licenses, Please, INTERNET ARCHIVE BLOGS (Oct. 8,
2015),
https://blog.archive.org/2015/10/08/our-comments-on-copyright-office-
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on mass digitizers to pay for use of these works.326 Small-time digitizers
such as libraries and niche web communities would be forced to pay
licensing fees to a CMO, which may not even give the money back to
the authors.327 Rather than do this, opponents argue these organizations
would be deterred from engaging in mass digitization at all.328
This viewpoint is overblown. Fair use would not be eliminated as a
result of this legislation—fair use would simply be supplemented by it.329
If a mass digitizer is able to make a clear case to a CMO whose
collection they want to digitize from, their work falls under the fair use
doctrine and the license fee would be low or non-existent.330 Larger
mass digitizers, such as Google Books, who do not discriminate
whatsoever in the content of their collection, would end up paying the
largest proportion of licensing fees.331
CONCLUSION
Humanity lost the world’s first Great Library to the fires of war.332
Thousands of years later, we have been graced with a second chance.
We must not emulate the sins of our ancestors and allow this great
digital library to escape us.
Congressional legislation dealing with mass digitization would
provide a solution that considers the interests of authors, mass digitizers,
and the public alike. Specifically, an ECL model gives authors
remuneration for their challenging work, mass digitizers legal certainty,
and the public digital access to millions of literary works. An ECL’s
potential for success is seen domestically with ASCAP, and seen abroad
through private VCL and other public ECL initiatives.333
While the United States does not have the same history of statutory
ECL models that many European nations do, this evolution is necessary
to foster the growth of technology that provides such boundless benefit
to society. This congressional action represents more than a green light
for mass digitizers—to act is to choose to endow authors with the right

recommendations-for-mass-digitization-no-extended-collective-licenses-please-2/
[https://perma.cc/X2VY-GR6X].
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 24, at 101.
330. Id.
331. See id.
332. Haughton, supra note 1.
333. See supra Subpart I.B.
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to be justly compensated for their contributions to society.
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